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Histories of suspicion in a time of conspiracy: 
A reflection on Aubrey Lewis' history of paranoia 
 
 
Writing insanity's past:  From grand to local histories 
 
In this paper, I will develop a reading of an account of the history of the category of 
mental disorder known as 'paranoia' 1, written by an eminent British psychiatrist, Aubrey 
Lewis.  The analysis will draw on both the ideological context in which the account is 
embedded and the interests dominant and subjugated within the text.  I will argue that 
Lewis' paper depicts the history of paranoia as continuous, scientific, coherent and 
empirically optimistic and thus renders itself acontextual, failing to pay regard to a whole 
range of influences both on its development as a concept (ideological, professional, 
political and so on) and in its practical usage 2. 
 
The historiographical literature dealing with psychiatry and insanity is marked by a wide 
diversity of orientation and content.  However, the field appears to be moving from 
grand generalizations (either about the wonders or the horrors of psychiatry) to more 
localised and specific accounts.  Rose (1986), for example, has called for a focus on the 
'proliferation of sites for the practice of psychiatry'; the 'psychiatrization of new problems 
and the differentiation of the psychiatric population'; the 'new distribution of professional 
powers'; the 'free market in [mental health] expertise'; and the 'multiplicity of techniques 
of normalization' (1986:83-84). 
 
Berrios (1988) has argued that some of the unhelpfulness of linear accounts of the 
history of psychiatry and 'abnormal psychology' can be resolved if accounts can be 
developed of histories of 'psychopathology' as an enterprise in general and 
psychopathological phenomena in particular.  Although accounts of the historical 
developments of particular categories of disorder might be useful, a number of 
challenges present themselves.  First, categories can only be studied within the broader 
context of categorical development in general.  Manuals like those produced by the 
American Psychiatric Association (APA) - for example the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-III-R -  and the World Health Organization (WHO) - 
for example the International Classification of Diseases, Tenth revision: ICD-10 - are 
relatively recent developments.  Second, there is considerable debate about whether 
categories refer to the same phenomena over time.  Bynum et al (1985) ask 'is there 
any such natural object of "madness" at all?' (1985:3) since the meaning of such terms 
'change profoundly from epoch to epoch, in ways inexplicable unless viewed within 
wider contexts of shifting power relations, social pressures and ideological interests' 
(1985:4).  The work of Smith (1988) and Danziger (1990), casting similar doubt over 
psychological terms in general, concurs with this view.   
 
Moreover, categories can no longer be seen as gradual refinements in concepts which 
remained essentially the same over time.  The evidence cited for the existence of 
certain phenomena are often problematic as Boyle (1990) has noted.  There is wide use 
of case material sometimes only briefly described.  Barrett's (1988) work has shown 
how the ambiguity and complexity of what is said in the context of a psychiatric interview 
becomes transformed into uncomplicated objectified symptoms in psychiatric 
case-notes.  Furthermore, we rarely have first-hand accounts of experiences of distress, 
only second-hand and highly interested case descriptions by 'mad-doctors'.  Indeed, 
even where autobiographical accounts exist (eg Porter, 1987) more space tends to be 
given to professional interpretations than to the authors' views. 
 
Finally, there is a need to differentiate between 'the history of words, concepts and the 
behavioural phenomena involved' (Berrios, 1991:7).  A history of the term 'anxiety' might 
be different from a history of the emotional state as it is currently defined in Western 
psychiatric texts (eg feelings of worry and so on).  However, such distinction between 
term and concept often betrays an essentialist approach to the definitions of certain 
terms.  Could a certain emotional state or abnormal behaviour be said to have existed if 
there were no terms to discriminate it from other states and behaviours - surely any 
concept requires some form of descriptive language?  Following such an analysis there 
might be some truth in the view that the delimination of a new psychiatric concept 
actually 'creates' cases which fit its description.  Rose (1990) has noted that the 
vocabularies of the 'psy' professions are 'languages of government [which] do not 
merely mystify domination or legitimate power.  They make new sectors of reality 
thinkable and practicable' (Rose, 1990:105-106).  Psychiatric cases are thus  'brought 
forth' by the availability of a language to describe them in ways which differentiate them 
from similar cases (M╤ndez, Coddou and Maturana, 1988).  However, psychiatric 
concepts are often dependent on 'lay' notions.  MacDonald's (1981) account suggests 
that 'suspiciousness' was regarded as a symptom of mental distress in the 17th century 
long before de Sauvages' use of paranoia (by which he denoted a more general form of 
madness than simply unwarranted suspicion) and its first use in English in the 19th 
century (Hoad, 1986).  Moreover, the associated word 'delusion' had been in use in 
English since the 15th century (Hoad, 1986).  Tracing the history of a term is difficult 
enough, but comparing particular manifestations across time is daunting.  MacDonald 
(1981), in his study of madness in 17th century England, for example, describes how 
forty two of Richard Napier's patients had symptoms of suspiciouness (1981:243).  Does 
this mean the same as a present-day symptom such as 'persecutory delusion'?   
 
Although such issues are difficult to grapple with, an account of a particular typology or 
category can be extremely useful in 'identifying the surfaces of emergence of psychiatric 
phenomena' (Miller, 1986:39) and in detailing the ways in which 'governance of the soul' 
is achieved through the discourses of science, the establishment of accredited experts 
and through the inflitration of personal desire as opposed to solely coercive professional 
practices (Rose, 1989, 1990).  Hepworth and Griffin (1990) have developed an 
interesting analysis of the 'discovery' of 'anorexia nervosa' in the late 19th century by 
examining three papers written by W.W. Gull between 1868-1888 and a report by C.E. 
Las╓gue in 1873.  They argue that this new category of mental disorder, constructed 
through a number of discourses, served to medicalize self-starvation, presenting it both 
as a typically feminine condition and as a natural corollary of feminine irrationality.  The 
rhetorical strategies which enabled the creation of such a condition involved reference to 
clinical discourses, and discourses  of femininity, of medical science, of discovery and of 
hysteria.  Such investigations help detail the contours of the interests engaged in the 
emergence of a new psychiatric condition.  The benefit of concentrating on a specific 
category of disorder, then, is less that it is easier to write the history of the disorder, but 
more that a space is created in which to describe a critical genealogy of that particular 
disorder and to examine in more detail the interests at stake in its construction. 
Lewis (1970) as an exemplar of psychiatric histories of psychiatry 
 
The focus here is a history of paranoia by Aubrey Lewis (Lewis, 1970).  The reason 
behind the selection of one specific account of history is, as  I will argue, that the writing 
of histories of psychiatry and psychiatric concepts, like paranoia, are of interest in 
themselves.  The concentration is less on this account's status as a history but much 
more on its status as a text.  Here, then, there will be less of a concern with the 
accuracy of the text's assertions but rather with what the text does and what interests it 
serves 3.  The study of rhetoric in the human sciences is becoming increasingly popular 
(eg Simons, 1989) and the identification of the purposes of history-writing has come to 
be seen as a legitimate activity (eg Smith, 1988).  Although any kind of text of 
history-writing could have been chosen, the value of choosing a history of a particular 
disorder is that the peculiar contexts and interests at play in the construction both of the 
disorder and the text can be described in more detail.  In examining both what is said 
and what is not said in this example, the present study will be conducted in a manner 
similar to current formulations of discourse analysis (Edwards and Potter, 1992; Parker, 
1992). 
 
The motive for concentrating  solely on paranoia is that, as I have already suggested, 
given the charges levelled at essentialist historians of psychology by the likes of 
Danziger (1990) and Smith (1988), studying the historical development of certain 
categories of mental disorder allows a more detailed analysis of the context of their 
emergence and transformation over time and facilitates the identification of some of the 
themes noted in broader historical accounts.  An increasing number of researchers are 
studying particular psychiatric disorders and psychological concepts: anorexia nervosa 
(Hepworth and Griffin, 1990); inhibition (Smith, 1992); delusion (Berrios, 1991); 
'obsessions' (Berrios, 1985); the reflex (Canguilhem, 1989); schizophrenia (Boyle, 1990) 
and 'shell-shock' (Stone, 1985).  Berrios (1993) has reviewed a number of recent 
historical studies of clinical concepts. 
 
What is so significant about  Lewis?  Lewis' account is particularly interesting for a 
number of reasons.  First, although other histories are available (eg Kendler and 
Tsuang, 1981; Scharfetter, 1983; Turkat, 1985) none of them are as ambitious in scope 
or as widely cited as Lewis' monograph.  The Social Science Citations Index lists 12 
citations of Lewis' text between 1970-1980.  The Institute of Scientific Information's 
on-line Social Science Database and Science Database list 20 citations of Lewis (1970) 
between 1981-September 1993.  Altogether, 32 citations over a 23 year period.  This, 
taking into account the highly specific nature of the paper suggests it is seen by many 
writers in the psychiatric literature as an important description of the history of paranoia. 
 
Second, Aubrey Lewis was an important figure in mainstream British psychiatry - 
indeed, the dust-jacket of his collected later papers declares  him to be 'the most 
important psychiatrist of his generation' (Lewis, 1979).  Shepherd's (1986) work 
demonstrates his enormous influence on the Maudsley Hospital's Institute of Psychiatry 
- a focal point for the development of British psychiatry - both as its chair from 
1945-1966 and, after his retirement, as emeritus professor 4.  Michael Shepherd, one of 
Lewis' junior colleagues later to become a major figure in British psychiatry himself, 
editing the esteemed psychiatric journal Psychological Medicine, has noted 'it is now 
apparent that at the Institute of Psychiatry Sir Aubrey Lewis played the major role in the 
laying of the foundations of academic psychiatry in Great Britain' (Shepherd, 1968:xi).  
Kety (1968) states how Lewis' 'broad erudition and wisdom give him a rightful place 
among the world's leaders in psychiatry.  His inspiration, judgement and indefatigable 
but unassuming energy have made the Institute of Psychiatry at the Maudsley Hospital 
a bulwark of sound and scientific psychiatry' (Kety, 1968:5) 
 
Third, not only is Lewis an important figure in British psychiatry, he is also important in 
British psychiatric history-writing.  Shepherd has described how, in his later years, Lewis 
was able to concentrate on 'fundamental issues relating to the definition and 
classification of mental disorders and the relevance of an historical perspective to the 
theory and practice of psychiatry' (Shepherd, 1979:ix).  Lewis' doctoral thesis on 
'melancholia' - published in the Journal of Mental Science in 1934 - marked Lewis' early 
interest in the history of psychiatric concepts.  The collection of his later papers contains 
eight published articles historical in content - 6 of them, interestingly, appearing in 
Psychological Medicine.  These include explorations of the concepts of 'anxiety', 'drug 
dependence', paranoia, 'endogenous and exogenous depression', 'psychogenesis', 
'psychopathy', 'hysteria' and 'phobia'.  In most of these articles, Lewis uses historical 
records to argue a particular point about the  definition or classification of a disorder, at 
times suggesting a category is dropped, often recommending a 'correct' definition 
distilled from his historical researches.  They tend to be marked by a great number of 
decontextualised quotations which, perhaps, also reflects the particular selection of 
books available at the Institute of Psychiatry's library 5. 
 
In some ways therefore, Lewis' description of the history of paranoia provides an 
establishment figure's perspective both on the nature of paranoia and on the nature of 
the history of psychiatry.  In examining this text both  in terms of what is said (and how it 
is said) and what is left unsaid, an opportunity is provided to describe a politically 
dominant  version of the history of British empirical psychiatry in general and paranoia in 
particular (perhaps, implicitly, the history of paranoia).  It is useful therefore to examine 
Lewis' text in more detail in order to explore which histories are privileged (and which 
not) and to suggest reasons why.  Rather than trying to uncover the 'real' meaning of 
the text or to speculate on what the author's intentions were in writing, Lewis' article will 
be taken as an exemplary text.  For the reasons outlined above, the paper could be said 
to have exemplified the views of British mainstream psychiatric orthodoxy at a particular 
moment in history.  This analysis will therefore draw on some of the social and historical 
factors which may have influenced Lewis' writing of history.  This should not be 
interpreted as a personal attack on Lewis but rather as an analysis of the interests 
which shape the production of his text as with any text.  From the fact that historians can 
only draw on those things which are recorded (which arguably, are the least important 
facets of everyday life) to the interests and orientations of those who write it, history, 
perhaps more than any other field, could be said to be dramatically influenced by a 
number of contextual factors.   
 
 
'Paranoia and paranoid:  A historical perspective' 
 
Space precludes a detailed summary of Lewis' paper and interested readers should 
read the original in full.  For present purposes it will suffice to describe the broad 
structure of his review.  The paper, of approximately 8,000 words, appeared as the first 
article in the first volume of Psychological Medicine.  It  begins by noting that words 
which have passed from psychiatric to lay usage, like paranoia, have loose meanings 
due to the fact that their technical meanings have wavered over time.  Lewis traces the 
word back to Greek literature where it was a general term for madness.  He reports no 
other use of the word before de Sauvages who used the word to represent both 
dementia (in his 1759 Pathologia Methodica) and 'amentia'6 (in his 1763 Nosologia 
Methodica).  Lewis does not explain why de Sauvages in the 18th century should 
choose an ancient Greek word although he states that it was revived to 'meet 
classificatory needs' (1970:2).  Nearly half of the manuscript deals solely with the 
German literature.  Heinroth is first mentioned, with  his involvement in establishing 
paranoia as a synonym for 'Verrcktheit' being noted.  An equal portion is devoted to 
Kahlbaum.  Lewis then deliberates on 'the paranoia question' outlining sources of 
disagreement amongst German psychiatrists and pointing to the increased use of the 
term paranoia rather than 'Verrcktheit'.  A further page details the work of Kraepelin 
who is seen as 'the best guide to central opinion' (1970: 5) and a similar amount is 
dedicated to the ideas of Kretschmer, Lange, Gauppe and Kolle.  In contrast to the 
space given to German debates, 'French views' takes up only a page describing 
discussions 'parallel but independent' to the German literature.  Lewis notes the 
contribution of Esquirol (who he credits with delineating 'monomania' or 'D╤lire Partiel'), 
Las╓gue, Falret, Magnan and S╤glas.  He closes this section by noting that 
commentators like  G╤nil-Perrin, de Cl╤rambault  and Lacan used the term but that 
French psychiatrists had not 'collectively taken' to the word.  He argues that he cannot 
justify further detail on French accounts since it would 'lead too far from the theme of 
this article, the vicissitudes of the word "paranoia" - a word never heartily welcomed in 
France' (1970:8). 
 
Lewis' interpretation of British views is stark, detailing the opinions of Tuke, Maudsley, 
Norman and Clouston.  His dealing with American ideas is even briefer (only 10 lines 
long) with only Spitzka and Meyer being mentioned before the paper moves into a 
discussion of Freud.  The case of Schreber is touched upon as well as the importance 
of personality in diagnosing paranoia.  The ideas of Leonhard are reviewed and some 
space is taken up with Lewis' contention that although paranoia is felt to be rare there is 
much 'looseness' in how it is used.  He complains that the 'literary and vernacular use of 
"paranoid" as meaning "resentfully distrustful" is as inexact as the corresponding use of 
"hysterical" ' (1970:9).  Current continental (ie German, Swiss and French) views are 
summarised in half a page.  Contemporary British and American usage gets a little more 
space with the views of Cameron taking some prominence.  This section concludes with 
Lewis acknowledging that the article has been largely Euro-centric but, he suggests, 
wider investigation 'might reveal only slight variations from what has been evident in the 
countries referred to above' (1970:10). 
 
Lewis concludes his paper with a prescriptive question:  'How, then, is "paranoid" to be 
defined so that it has the least subjectivity and the most tenable basis possible ...?' 
(1970:11).  Without any reference to the preceding historical discussion he states that a 
paranoid syndrome covers a wide-range of self-referential delusions.  He argues that a 
paranoid personality refers to a person exhibiting features of a paranoid syndrome but 
where there are dominant ideas rather than delusions.  He suggests paraphrenia should 
be subsumed within this category.  He concludes by stating 'the syndrome will 
eventually be classifiable in one of the major categories of mental disorder' (1970:11) 
 
 
Re-reading Lewis:  A critical overview 
 
... the past ... must be revisited, but with irony, not innocently. 
 
                                                   Eco (1985:67) 
 
Attempting to summarise Lewis' account is a difficult enterprise since it is at once both 
extremely detailed and superficial.  For example, although it is not clear what purpose it 
serves, he quotes several extracts from important figures in their original language 
(Latin, French and German).  However, he also passes over the contributions of many 
other commentators and devotes little space to important debates.  He apologises on 
several occasions for not describing other views in more depth because of limitations of 
space, his lack of knowledge of other languages and because he sees the aim of the 
paper as describing the 'vicissitudes of the word "paranoia"' (1970:8).  The paper could 
be seen as a number of decontextualised quotations linked together by Lewis' narrative. 
 Indeed, his placing of these quotations in their original language gives an impression of 
allowing historical figures to 'speak for themselves' although clearly Lewis' choices are, 
of necessity, highly selective 7.  His historiography tends towards the conservative with 
the  analysis drawing mainly on internal factors although it is implicitly allowed - through 
the way the paper is ordered - that writers (especially same-language writers) referred 
to each other.  However, there is virtually no discussion of external factors - not even of 
intellectual developments in allied disciplines like philosophy.  Lewis gives little detail of 
historical context in his description of changes but, by using an implicit rhetoric of 
scientific progress he tends towards justificatory presentist concerns.  He combines a 
'great men' and a Zeitgeist approach although stressing the role influential individuals 
(all men and all white) played in developing theoretical changes.   
 
 
Continuity 
 
Edwards and Potter (1992) in their argument for a discursive psychology have 
suggested that speakers use a variety of rhetorical strategies in order to have particular 
effects.  The main issue in their work is how speakers manage to construct certain 
accounts as 'facts' - often when there is some disagreement about 'the truth'.  They 
argue that an often-neglected analytic topic in such analyses of discourse is that of 
interest and they describe a number of examples showing how speakers with particular 
interests portray certain accounts as 'factual' in order to pursue those interests.  It is 
reasonable to suppose that similar strategies might be used to further writers' interests 
in the writing of history.  One of the effects of Lewis' approach is to increase the 
historicity of the account and to persuade the reader that the writer has been able to 
omit irrelevant detail in order to provide a broad sweep of historical development.  The 
writer can further this persuasion by providing evidence that they have studied in great 
detail by providing verbatim quotations from original sources.  However, such an 
approach also helps to provide a sense of continuity where there may, perhaps, not be 
one.   
 
In Lewis' account of a history marked more by discontinuity and disagreement than 
continuity and agreement, the provision of a sense of continuity is a central issue.   
Interestingly, for example, Lewis begins his paper with a discussion of how the word 
paranoia was used by the Greeks.  The abstract to his paper states the 'history of the 
words paranoia and paranoid is traced from the Greeks to the present day and their 
fluctuations of usage and concept are explored' (1970:2).  However, as a closer look at 
his account shows, there was no historical connection between the ancient Greeks and 
the modern day other than de Sauvages' choice of a Greek word.  It may well be that de 
Sauvages chose the word in order to create a sense of authenticity for the concept 
following the common medical and scientific practice of using Greek and Latin terms to 
denote categories.  Indeed the appeal to history is a common rhetorical strategy and 
was one of the criticisms of paranoia made by Henry Maudsley in his 1895 text: 'To 
christen it mental derangement would appear plain nonsense:  to call it so in Greek 
passes for scientific nomenclature' (quoted in Lewis, 1970:8).   
 
The fact that Lewis traces the use of a particular word over time provides a paradoxical 
sense of continuity in that although the meaning changes, the word is still the same.  
Lewis' description of paranoia is similar to his accounts of other concepts in that he 
holds an essentialist view, arguing that meanings of the particular concepts 'waver'.  
This is no surprise, given his nosologic concerns, nor are they unusual 8.  At other times 
Lewis concentrates not on the word paranoia but on the concepts underlying it (as in his 
discussion of French work).  Once again, this leads the reader to feel that although 
writers may call a concept by different names, there is still a certain amount of 
agreement between them.  Moreover, Lewis, like any writer, provides a sense of 
continuity through his writing.  As the reader is led through a number of different, 
sometimes contradictory views, the voice of the narrator relativizes the differences 
through different appeals and techniques.  For example, Lewis treats time in different 
ways depending on his apparent aims.  Thus he argues that Heinroth launched paranoia 
on a second career after 'a retirement of 40 years' (1970:2).  The gap (which was 
actually only thirty five years) is matched in a number of places by other intervals of time 
(eg twenty seven years between Heinroth and Griesinger; twenty six years between 
Lasegue and Falret) which do not even merit comment. 
 
A further method of suggesting continuity is Lewis' treatment of differences of view.  His 
main way of doing this is simply to report the differences and move on, with little 
comment or judgement, to the next chronological figure allowing the dynamic of the 
narrative to provide continuity.  Another approach is to direct attention to a figure who 
holds a consensus view.  Thus, after noting the general disagreement about the 
definition of paranoia, Lewis states that a 'firm effort to tidy the semantic confusion was 
made by Westphal in 1878' (1970:4).  At another time, Lewis notes that it was 'hardly 
possible to speak of a consensus amid the wrangling, but the nearest approach to one 
in the 1890s was provided by Snell...' (1970:4).  Later, Lewis comments that it was 
'noteworthy that in spite of the apparently irreconcilable views separating the 
Kraepelinian from the Kretschmer concepts, Johannes Lange, Kraepelin's pupil and 
closest associate, was content to say that Kraepelin's paranoia was extremely rare and 
that it sometimes arose on the basis of a mild schizophrenic defect or schizoid 
character: or even became evident in the lingering phases of a manic-depressive 
psychosis' (1970:6).  At other points, Lewis highlights what is agreed between 
protagonists: 'Almost all writers during this period stress that in paranoia consciousness 
is clear ...' (1970:5).  In this way, sharp disagreements and discontinuities in the use of 
the word and the concept are, if not silenced, at least subjugated by a dominant and 
essentialist view of history.   
 
Another way of portraying a continuity of history is Lewis' implicit use of a rhetoric of 
increasing knowledge and scientific advancement.  Such a discourse is enabled by 
concentrating on certain historical figures devoid of a detailed historical, social, political 
and philosophical context.  Indeed, Lewis, at points, displays an  enigmatically uncritical 
view of history describing historical change at one point as a 'turn of the wheel' (1970:8). 
 The figures chosen are examples of 'great men'.  Thus Lewis selects Kraepelin 
because of 'the great influence he exercised and the clarity and honesty with which he 
expressed his changing views' and since he was a guide to 'central opinion' (1970:5).  
Lewis notes, with approval, the choice of empirical methods modelled on the natural 
sciences and an emphasis on course and outcome in, for example, his description of 
Kahlbaum's and Kraepelin's work although commentators like Boyle (1990) have argued 
that they did not employ scientific methods despite the rhetoric of the time.  The 
highlighting of the increased use of empirical methods is matched in this account by 
suggestions that nosological differences exist because of non-empirical factors, for 
example the 'theoretical moves that sometimes enlivened and sometimes dessicated 
German psychiatry' (1970:7).   
 
 
Presentism 
 
Lewis makes few critical comments during his historical discussion.  This is all the more 
surprising in view of the fact that he has strong views.  For example, he complains of 
'looseness' (1970:9) in the way paranoia is used and argues that the vernacular 
meaning of the term is 'inexact' (1970:9).  At the end of the paper he moves from his 
historical review into a prescriptive mode, asking how paranoia should be defined so it is 
least subjective and most tenable.  Straightforwardly, he states that 'a paranoid 
syndrome is one in which there are delusions of self-reference which may be concerned 
with persecution, grandeur ...' (1970:11).  Here, there is no mention of disagreement or 
debate.  Indeed there is certainty, expressed in the comment that the 'syndrome will 
eventually be classifiable in one of the major categories of mental disorder' (1970:11).  
The statement of what paranoia is, from a position of authority is surprising after ten 
pages of discussion of confusion and disagreement.  At various points paranoia has 
been presented as:  both a general term for and rare form of madness; a phenomenon 
both with and without hallucinations; an inevitably tenacious and a mild disease; and as 
the end-stage or mid-point of a disease process.  To move from such conflict to a 
definition is surprising.   
 
Such certainty is part of the rhetoric of scientific advancement noted above but is also, 
perhaps, a function of Lewis' powerful social position in British psychiatry.  Parker 
(1989), notes how eminent figures have more freedom to state their own opinions and 
argues that this 'reflects and reproduces social status positions (in which those higher 
up give their "thoughts"...and the minions have to offer "facts" ' (1989:155).  When his  
paper was published, Lewis had already occupied a role as a 'standard-setter, the 
repository of wisdom, experience and common-sense' (Shepherd, 1986:17).  After his 
retirement in 1966, Lewis made what Shepherd calls his 'most significant contribution' of 
that decade in his series of papers on 'the derivation and meaning of several terms and 
concepts in common psychiatric use' (1986:18).  Shepherd (1986) also casts some light 
on the urgency in the text to close down discussion of disagreement and confusion and 
instead move towards prescription and certainty since, during this time, Lewis was 
'steering the British and the WHO glossaries of psychiatric terminology through their 
various stages' (1986:19) 9.  These had the aim of enabling psychiatrists 'regardless of 
their native tongue and their theoretical persuasion, to adopt a common language for 
the purposes of communication' (1986:19). 
 
It is thus reasonable to suggest that Lewis' linguistic history of paranoia was partly 
motivated by a nosological agenda of asserting what paranoia was and how it should be 
defined.  Such concerns often go hand-in-hand with essentialist positions and they are a 
common feature of Lewis' histories of other terms (see Lewis, 1979).  Interestingly, 
eleven years after Lewis' paper was published, Kendler and Tsuang (1981) commented: 
 
In the past substantial disagreements have existed as to the proper nosologic 
classification of the paranoid psychotic disorders.  A review of current diagnostic 
systems shows that this disagreement persists to the present day. 
 
Kendler and Tsuang (1981:608) 
 
Kenneth Kendler,  an influential American psychiatrist, was and is involved to a large 
extent with the development of the APA's diagnostic manuals 10.  His and Tsuang's 
discussion following their historical review of paranoia also had a clear empiricist 
nosological agenda similar to Lewis' in that they aimed at developing a 'truly scientific 
basis' (1981:609) for psychiatric nosology and, to this end, made a number of 
suggestions about specific diagnostic criteria.  The appeal to history could be said to 
provide a powerful warrant for the views of powerful psychiatric figures.  The move from 
historical review to prescription found in Lewis' history is matched in other accounts (see 
also Scharfetter, 1983).  
 
So far then, it is possible to discern a dominant version of history as told by Lewis - a 
kind of historicism with presentist nosologic and justificatory agenda.  It is also possible 
to speculate on some of the functions and reasons for that dominance including, for 
example, psychiatry's portrayal of itself as an advancing and legitimate scientific 
discipline.  As well as this dominant version reported by Lewis, however, there are other 
competing,  conflictual and discontinuous stories which are either subjugated or silenced 
altogether.  The rest of this paper aims to flesh out some of the stories and issues 
subjugated in this dominant account. 
 
 
Unspoken, silenced and subjugated stories in Lewis' history of paranoia 
 
I read, not to believe what the manifestoes said, but to look beyond them, as if 
the words meant something else.  To help them mean something else, I knew I 
should skip some passages and attach more importance to some statements 
than to others ... They were a coded message to be read by superimposing them 
on a grid, a grid that left certain spaces free while covering others ... Having no 
grid I had to assume the existence of one.  I had to read with mistrust. 
 
Eco (1990:394) 
 
I have argued that Lewis' account has certain effects in order to fulfill a number of 
functions - largely to do with the development of psychiatry - but an analysis must dwell 
not only on what is said in a text, it should also attend to what is not said (Parker, 1992). 
 
 
The historical and philosophical context of paranoia 
 
books always speak of other books, and every story tells a story that has already 
been told 
 
Eco (1985:20) 
 
A history of paranoia is, to some extent, a history of delusion.  We have seen above 
how paranoia can be traced back to the 19th century and delusion back to the 15th 
century.  However, Lewis' account largely ignores any of the intellectual context (both 
inside and outside of psychiatry) of the development of paranoia as a term.  Many 
histories of psychology and psychiatry examine developments in ideas as if writers were 
not influenced by other texts.  Berrios (1991) has provided a historical and philosophical 
corrective to such a view by arguing that current conceptions of delusions (of which 
paranoia is currently seen as a sub-set within most psychiatric texts) are based on 19th 
century views of belief and that although Jaspers is often credited with the 
commencement of the 'received view' of delusions, he, in fact, borrowed terms and 
concepts in common use - particularly by philosophers - in the 19th century.  Berrios 
(1991) suggests that the philosophical underpinnings of later psychiatric theories of 
delusions can be traced back to 17th century debates.  For example, both Hobbes and 
Locke, in their different ways, propounded views that helped develop intellectualist 
notions of insanity whereby delusions were seen to be almost synonymous with insanity. 
  
 
Berrios notes that it was only by the 1820s that delusions and hallucinations were 
conceptually separated.  Through the 19th century a number of philosophical 
developments laid the foundations for current conceptions of delusions.  These included 
the displacement of Lockean associationism by faculty psychology; the separation of 
knowledge and belief; views of delusions as conceptions and of hallucinations as 
disturbances in perceptual processes; a concentration on the form rather than the 
content of individual symptoms (which Berrios, 1988, terms the 'anatomo-clinical' model 
of disease); the viewing of delusions as 'morbid beliefs'; and the growth of theories of 
personality.  However, Berrios' agenda is to argue that since current conceptions of 
delusions are based on 19th century views of belief, newer ideas about beliefs should 
be used to re-conceptualize delusional phenomena: 
 
Such conceptual bases include an obsolete theory of language, the epistomology 
of introspection sponsored by classical psychology, and views of intentionality 
that did not allow for the existence of 'empty' speech acts.  Progress has since 
been made in all three areas, but little effort has been made to update the 
conceptual structure of delusion:  indeed, it may well be the case that such 
updating could precipitate its disintegration. 
 
Berrios (1991:6-7) 
 
Berrios argues that delusions are not really beliefs anyway and are, instead, 'empty 
speech acts that disguise themselves as beliefs' (1991:8) since they do not fulfill certain 
abstract criteria for belief.  It is possible to challenge such a view since such criteria do 
not take account of discourse analytic work suggesting that essentialist notions of 
'attitudes' and 'beliefs' are problematic (Harper, 1992).  However despite the existence 
of a presentist agenda Berrios' paper is interesting in making links between psychiatric 
and philosophical theories.  Moreover, he makes a number of interesting points about 
the linguistic differences between psychiatric terms hiding conceptual differences (eg 
the English delusion referred to a solely intellectual condition whereas the French D╤lire 
involved emotional and volitional elements as well).   
 
Both Berrios (1991) and Walker (1991) view Jaspers as the main historical figure behind 
current conceptions of delusions.  It is interesting that Lewis (1970) does not address 
any of his paper to developments in the history of delusion since it is clearly a related 
phenomena that would have influenced how paranoia was viewed.  Moreover, it is 
interesting to see that some historians, like Walker (1991), argue that although current 
texts cite Jaspers as the main proponent of the view that it is the form (eg bizarreness, 
conviction and falsity) of the delusion which is important rather than its content (eg 
persecutory themes), Jaspers actually suggested it was instead the relationship 
between the origins of the delusion and their relationship to the person's personality 
which was important.  This suggests that the citing of Jaspers in support of the view that 
delusional form is central is another example of the use of history as a warrant to give 
current conceptions of delusions authority and legitimacy. 
 
 
The nosological context of paranoia 
 
A history of paranoia is also a history of nosology (or classification).  Lewis discusses 
the variations in the use and definition of paranoia as if it were an isolated problem.  
However, the difficulties with diagnosis and classification are general and have a long 
history.  Moreover, psychiatric classification is not an unproblematic scientific 
endeavour.  Commentators like Widiger and Trull (1991) and Robins and Helzer (1986) 
note how diagnostic classifications serve a number of (often opposing) purposes and 
that they reflect a consensual, rather than a straightforwardly empirical, view of 
diagnosis.  Indeed, within the APA, committee decisions are sometimes voted on 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1987:xx).  In 1973 the APA Board of Trustees voted 
to remove homosexuality per se from the DSM although a related category was retained 
(Wilson, 1993).  Moreover, there is evidence both of exceptionally stringent acceptance 
criteria for some new diagnoses and of establishment duplicity (Caplan, 1991).  Wilson 
(1993) has provided a useful history of the DSM-III, placing it in its professional, political, 
social and intellectual context. 
 
Boyle (1990) has reviewed some of the beginnings of diagnostic classification, 
describing early attempts as being: 
 
distinguished mainly by their vagueness and multiplicity; by the last decades of 
the nineteenth century it was obvious, even to the most uncritical observer, that 
the result was chaos. 
 
Boyle (1990:87) 
 
Boyle notes how, in 1885, the Congress of Mental Medicine appointed a Commission to 
develop one classificatory system.  This was duly accepted by the then International 
Congress of Mental Science in 1889.  However, there were no data quoted in support of 
them and no real explicit definitions.  They did not enjoy extensive use and Boyle argues 
this was because of the lack of empirical evidence concerning patterns of 'abnormal 
behaviour' and the lack of any interest in scientific approaches by the asylum doctors.  
She argues that the continuing lack of empirical evidence meant there were no 
meaningful classificatory systems developed although popular categories like 
Kraepelin's dementia praecox and Bleuler's schizophrenia were used giving 'an 
impression of progress where none existed' (Boyle, 1990:89). 
 
Boyle (1990) traces the next stage of psychiatric classification from the WHO's revised 
International Statistical Classification of Diseases, Injuries and Causes of Death (ICD) in 
1948.  However, she criticises both ICD-6 and the APA's DSM-I for a failure to provide 
explicit correspondence rules.  One response to the lack of extensive use of these 
manuals was for the compilers to provide operational definitions which they did for the 
first time with ICD-8 and DSM-II.  However, Boyle asks of those who tried to find 
correspondence rules for diagnostic constructs 'how it could possibly be known which 
constructs justified the search - what criteria were to be used in choosing them?' 
(1990:92).  She argues that this problem bedevilled future revisions including ICD-9 
which was preceded by a series of seminars for 'experts' who attempted to agree on 
constructs - a process Boyle characterises as 'opinion surveys' (1990:94).  She notes 
that DSM-III was the first manual to specify clear operational definitions but argues that 
it still assumed that its constructs had empirical validity - a claim she goes on later to 
dispute 11. 
 
 
Psychoanalytic views on paranoia 
 
Lewis' account also gives little space to the psychoanalytic literature although he 
references both Freud and Lacan.  However, psycho-analysts have made a number of 
important contributions.  For example, Lacan's thesis for his medical doctorate was on 
paranoia and was published in 1932 (Lacan, 1932).  Freud wrote 9 articles on the topic 
beginning in 1895 with an unpublished manuscript, developing his ideas through a 
number of case histories (Rothgib, 1973).  In Paranoia (Freud, 1895) Freud postulated 
that paranoia was a pathological mode of defence with the purpose of fending off an 
idea incompatible with the ego, by projecting its substance into the outside world - this 
was Freud's first use of the term 'projection'.  Interestingly, Freud applied the idea of 
paranoid projection to the 'Grande Nation' that invents a delusion of betrayal because it 
cannot face the idea of defeat.  There was no mention at this time of the notion of 
paranoia as a consequence of the repression of homosexual desires which was to 
become memorable later.  By 1896, Freud was suggesting, in his presentation of the 
case of Frau P., that paranoia proceeded from the repression of distressing memories 
and that the form of the symptoms were determined by the content of what was 
repressed.  By 1911 with Freud's interpretation of the memoirs of Daniel Schreber he 
was asserting that the main causative factor in paranoia was repressed homosexual 
desire.  In 1915 Freud described the case of a young woman which appeared to run 
counter to his theory.  He concluded that the main issue was that the paranoia was a 
defence against desiring the persecutor.  He continued to believe that repressed sexual 
desires (although not necessarily homosexual) were the driving force. 
 
Although Freud's interpretation of Schreber has gained prominence there are other 
more plausible and interesting accounts.  For example, Sass (1987) uses both 
Schreber's autobiographical account and the interpretation by Schatzman (1973) in 
arguing that Schreber's experiences were related to his experience of physically and 
psychologically abusive child-rearing at the hands of his father, an influential 
paediatrician, who published several books on the subject of bringing up children.  
However, Sass develops Schatzman's analysis by suggesting that Schreber's crisis is 
the crisis of the modern soul.  He draws on Foucault's (1977) description of the 
Panopticon, a device which enabled prisoners to be watched without them necessarily 
being aware of being watched.  Prisoners were thus induced into behaving as if they 
were continually watched and hence regulating themselves without the need for external 
intervention.  Sass argues that Schreber's symptoms were related to his dual 
experience of himself as watcher and watched and that the reification of self-scrutiny 
through the various techniques developed by his father led to his becoming alienated 
from himself.     
 
 
Histories of conspiracy, suspicion and paranoia outside psychiatry 
 
But now I have come to believe that the world is an enigma, a harmless enigma 
that is made terrible by our own mad attempt to interpret it as though it had an 
underlying truth.      Eco (1990:95) 
 
Lewis'  account of paranoia leaves aside the political and social context of conspiracy 
and does not include an analysis of how paranoia and a belief in conspiracy have, in the 
past, and are today, located in everyday discourse.  Feelings of persecution and 
suspicion and the identification of conspiracies have occured throughout history in a 
range of contexts, few of them concerned with that area we now term 'mental health'.  
Possibly unwarranted feelings of persecution can be traced back to ancient texts.  The 
Psalmist cries: 
 
All day long they carp at my words, 
their only thought is to harm me, 
they gather together, lie in wait and spy on my movements, 
as though determined to take my life. 
 
The New Jerusalem Bible (1985, Psalm 56:5-6) 
 
Porter (1992), in his history of political espionage, notes that the imagining or inventing 
of spies has a longer history than that of the espionage profession itself.  His is a 
fascinating account of how excessive and unwarranted suspicion of conspiracy was a 
political strategy used by the British security services to further develop their agencies.  
Moreover the excessive secrecy both of home and foreign secret services meant that 
many suspicions were undeserved and were, in effect, driven by secrecy.  He has wryly 
observed differences between those who believe in the power of conspiracies to shape 
history and who know how easily people can be persuaded or subverted and those who 
believe conspiracies cannot work because of the large number of circumstances that 
would need to be manipulated in order for a significant conspiracy to succeed. 
 
Hofstadter (1966), in describing the paranoid style in American politics,  further 
highlights that suspicion is socially and politically constructed.  He draws out its political 
functions and significance by suggesting that, in America, conspiratorial rhetoric has 
been the preferred style of minority movements.  However, although often such 
conspiratorial polemic reflects minority views this does not necessarily mean they have 
no power (witness the McCarthyite America of the 1950s).  For Hofstadter, the paranoid 
style characterised as 'overheated, oversuspicious, overaggressive, grandiose, and 
apocalyptic' (Hofstadter, 1966:4) is not distinguished merely by the suggestion of the 
existence of conspiracies but also by the imperative that adherents 'regard a "vast" or 
"gigantic" conspiracy as the motive force in historical events' (Hofstadter, 1966:29, 
emphasis in original).  
 
Conspiracies have long existed as explanatory resources and Graumann and 
Moscovici's (1987) volume demonstrates the pervasiveness of conspiracy theories 
throughout history and cultural groups.  Groh (1987a) argues that conspiracies cannot 
be related to any one particular historical period and offers a tentative model of the 
development of group conspiracies.  He goes on (Groh, 1987b) to describe a wide 
range of case studies of conspiracies throughout history including the 'Jewish 
conspiracy' of the late middle ages; the Witch-hunts in the late middle ages; the 
'conspirations' of rebellious peasants in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and 
so on.  Indeed, anti-Semitism is a theme of another three chapters in the volume (Billig, 
1987; Poliakov, 1987; Zukier, 1987) - Jewish people being one of a number of the 
'favourites' for conspiracy theorists as well as witches, Jesuits, Freemasons and 
Communists (Graumann, 1987).  One of the issues that concerns both Groh (1987a) 
and Wulff (1987) is how to distinguish between individual and group paranoid delusions. 
 This ignores the fact, of course, that the diagnostic repertoire is flexible enough to 
enable groups to be diagnosed as deluded, for example as Folie a Deux or Folie a 
Plusieurs and attributed to some form of 'delusional infestation' (Enoch and Trethowan, 
1991).   
 
Since, I would argue,  the critical historian's role is not simply to employ suspicious 
interpretation in negative critiques but also positively in the production of a multiplicity of 
histories, attention to issues of reflexivity and the other areas subjugated within Lewis' 
history would, I think, generate more authentic histories of paranoia and other 
psychiatric categories. 
 
'Not bad, not bad at all,' Diotallevi said.  'To arrive at the truth through the 
painstaking reconstruction of a false text.'  Eco (1990:459) 
NOTES 
 
1.  Throughout this paper I have placed technical psychiatric terms in inverted commas 
at their first appearance in the text to highlight their problematic nature.  However, I feel 
it would only distract from my argument if I were to continually highlight all problematic 
terms in this way - a particularly distracting side-effect of some post-modernist writing. 
 
2.  Kendler (1982)  has demonstrated that people diagnosed as paranoid are more likely 
to be poorer; belong to 'lower' social classes; have less education; be more socially 
disadvantaged; and be immigrants, than people receiving related diagnoses. 
 
3.  Although I am not advocating that historical accuracy is not important, I have not 
attempted, in this account, to check Lewis' text for accuracy against the originals he 
cites although an anonymous referee suggests at least some of Lewis' quotations are 
inaccurate.  I have also tended to focus largely on the English-language literature.  The 
examination of non-English work is tremendously important but is beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
4.  More background information on Lewis is contained in Lewis (1979), Shepherd 
(1986) and Shepherd and Davies (1968). 
 
5.  I am indebted to an anonymous referee for this observation. 
 
6.  I have italicised non-English words but followed Lewis' (1970) convention by not 
doing this for Latin words in common use in British psychiatry. 
 
7.  Other papers by Lewis use quotes in their original language.  See for example his 
articles on psychogenesis, psychopathy and hysteria (in Lewis, 1979). 
 
8.  Turkat, for example, following his historical review states: 
 
In short, although the concept of paranoia has been around for thousands of 
years and is widely accepted as valid today, how to classify it, subclassify it, 
understand it, and treat it remains highly controversial. 
 
                                              Turkat (1985:163) 
 
9.  Indeed, a year before his death in 1975, the WHO published the Glossary of Mental 
Disorders and Guide to their Classification containing a foreword written by Lewis. 
 
10.  For example, the introduction to the DSM-III-R notes that Kendler sat on the 'work 
group' to revise DSM-III and three advisory committees on diagnostic categories:  
'psychotic disorders'; 'mood disorders'; and 'personality disorders' (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1987). 
 
11.  Despite, indeed perhaps because of, 'private' disagreement about its definition, 
paranoia has become an enshrined part of many diagnostic classificatory systems.  
Categories which elude clear definition are therefore available to be used flexibly in a 
range of circumstances and this, of course, can have enormous practical advantages for 
psychiatry (Harper, 1994). 
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